AAR: USS Opportunity reactivation

Subspace Network Reports
1
Stardate:
12345.6
Filed By:
CAPT BRADLEY CARTER
Clearance:

LOCATION 38th Fleet Starbase

MISSION Repair, reactivation and testing of shipboard systems

OUTCOME Several issues highlighted. Phasers, EPS conduits, main deflector. Progress on repairs made.

KEY PERSONNEL

  • CAPT Carter
  • CAPT Detuggo
  • LT Ansha Wind-People
  • ENS Sadaann

NARRATIVE Work is still ongoing on board the USS Opportunity. Progress is good, however every solution we implement seems to bring to light at least three more problems, fortunately however, these problems appear to be getting smaller. Recently we’ve been fortunate enough to have volunteers from other starships lend a hand in getting the Opportunity back up to speed, allowing us to keep to a reasonably fast timetable.

Captain Detuggo and Ensign Sadaann were assisting with work from the bridge. We were attempting to run a series of tests on the phasers and targeting systems, however, we discovered a fault in the low power utility phaser shunt buffer, likely caused by corrosion. Instead of applying zero point zero five percent power, the system shorted and dumped an alarming amount of energy through the main upper saucer strip resulting in an extremely impressive phaser blast.

Uknown to Captain Detuggo, myself and Ensign Sadaann, Lieutenant Ansha Wind-People was currently on EVA near the phaser strip, having apparently been cleared by a Chief Dagnus. She was fortunately uninjured, albeit, a little shaken. I recommended for her to go in for a quick medical check up just in case, however she reported no ill effects and instead got to work assisting with troubleshooting our deflector array, successfully finding an issue that had previously eluded us.

RECOMMENDATION Disciplinary action against Chief Dagnus, likely reduction in rank following an NJP. USS Opportunity’s systems still need a lot of work, including replacement of utility phaser shunt buffer and deflector LLI.
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RECOGNITION LT Ansha Wind-People’s professionalism following such an alarming incident was notable and impressive, not to mention being able to quickly diagnose and isolate a previously elusive problem with nothing but quick thinking and a hairpin.

OOC Any OOC information tied to this report can be listed here. If your event had a mission brief posting, please link it here! This is also a great place for @mentions too. If you have no OOC info to share, you can delete this whole section.
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2
Stardate:
100645.8
Filed By:
CAPT Gerree Detuggo
Clearance:

LOCATION DS13 - Near Space Dock

MISSION Testing of USS Opportunity Phaser Banks

OUTCOME Negligent discharge of weapons endangering life of crew

KEY PERSONNEL

  • CAPT Detuggo
  • CAPT Carter
  • LT Ansha Wind-People
  • CPO Dagnus

NARRATIVE On Stardate 100645 the Commanding Officer of the USS Opportunity - CAPT Carter - put out a request for volunteers to assist in maintenance and repairs to starship systems. As I was between assignments I chose to render assistance in bringing tactical systems online and up to Starfleet standards.

Shortly after coming aboard I requested to conduct a weapons test. One of the engineering personnel - an ENS Sadaan - indicated issues with EPS conduits that fed into phaser systems. As this indicated a potential for overload I waited until after CAPT Carter indicated a bypass was completed and systems were safe for testing. Per standard testing procedures near a starbase I requested several calibration buoys be placed at 50,000 kilometers, 100,000 kilometers, and 200,000 kilometers off the bow of USS Opportunity. I then requested space traffic control direct traffic away from our firing corridor per standard safety procedures.

Just prior to the start of the test I asked CAPT Carter if any EVAs were ongoing as even at lowest settings phasers represent a substantial risk to personnel. On being told no EVAs were scheduled I set phasers to minimal settings to test targeting alignments and commenced firing. Upon discharge weapons overloaded and produced an enormously powerful blast that destroyed two of the three calibration buoys. The third was spared damage due to misalignment causing phaser beam to miss final target by 70 meters.

Shortly after the overload LT Ansha Wind-People reported to the bridge. She indicated she had, at the time of firing, been EVA conducting maintenance work upon the phaser banks. It was only through experience and quick thinking she was able to avoid serious injury and/or death. As no EVAs had been scheduled and no lockouts existed on the phaser systems both myself and CAPT Carter immediately inquired who authorized the EVA. We were told this authorization was given by a Chief Petty Officer Dagnus.

As Starfleet protocol ordinarily requires a lockout order be issued on high-power systems - and ESPECIALLY weapons systems - prior to any work being conducted, and it was ultimately me who discharged the phasers, I felt this incident represented gross negligence in basic safety protocols and it was my duty to file a report. I wish to be clear that I feel that CAPT Carter and LT Ansha Wind-People both acted within accordance to Starfleet protocols and regulations and that this incident was beyond all of our control. I do believe however that the authorization should not have been given and even if it was it was the duty of CPO Dagnus to ensure appropriate systems were locked out and tactical department notified before authorizing EVA.

RECOMMENDATION Investigation into communications breakdown that led to both EVA not being reported and phasers remaining online despite being worked on by crew. Severe disciplinary action upon responsible parties to acknowledge that this incident endangered the life of an officer.

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3
Stardate:
100645.9
Filed By:
LT Ansha Wind-People
Clearance:

ADDENDUM
I had volunteered to assist in efforts to ready the Galaxy Class cruiser, USS Opportunity, for service. As I am a Tactical Officer I was assigned to assist with repair efforts on the phasor array, which had dead spots, or sections that lacked sufficient power output.

I was working on Starboard Forward emission lattice, where it was noted that a magnetic focus lens was corroded and in need of replacement. This is a job that would either require replacement at a dock yard with gantry and tractor beam system, or by hand, as the adjustment require a level of dexterity that worker bee shuttle lacks. It was therefore decided that an EVA was necessary and since I was, at present, the only one available with EVA certification as well as task experience, then I would need to make the EVA and do the repairs.

At 100644.5 I made a call to Flight Control to request red tag of the tactical systems onboard the USS Opportunity, as well as to indicate my intention to make an EVA for the purposes of working on the Phasor Array. The call was replied to be Chief Petty Officer Dagnus, who stated that weapon systems would be tagged that I am cleared for EVA.

At 100644.7 I made egress into space and under suit thrusters made my way to the lens which had been transported to a location nearby. I was able to easily manipulate the part as microgravity was in effect, and proceeded to the location on the array that required attention.

At 100644.75 I arrived at the location and verified the installed lens was in need of replacement. I commenced the replacement.

At 100644.85 The replacement was complete and the old part was transported into the hanger bay for examination and recycling. It was around this time that I felt a build up of static electricity, as well as the familiar light racing along the array side from aft. I determined that the array was energized and in the process of being fired. I pressed the emergency thrust button and guided my suit away from the main dish with rapid acceleration.

As I was approximately 75 meters from the array, the beam fired, albeit at reduced power as per Starfleet and base regulations. The heat was intense but I was protected by my suit which bore most of the charring and damage. I was sent spinning off towards the station, but I was able to regain control of my suit.

I was able to get back to the dorsal airlock 15. My queries as to the whereabouts of CPO Dagnus were unanswered, so I proceeded to the bridge to find out what happened. This is where I discovered no red tag condition had been in place and no one knew I was at EVA, and working on the phasor array.

Fortunately, I was unharmed. The lens was installed and seemed to handle the current put through it well, which I was able to visually confirm.

RECOMMENDATION It was noted that many crewmembers, particularly senior enlisted and junior officers onboard the USS Opportunity had been neglecting adequate rest cycles in an effort to complete repairs. Though I have no proof this was a cause or even a contributing factor, it is recommended that rest periods, as suggested by Starfleet recommendations be strictly enforced.

Also, to my own actions, I (or whoever is performing an EVA) should visually verify that 1) a red tag condition has been placed on the system or systems in question using any PADD or console near by, and 2) knowledge of an EVA occurring has been transmitted to CONN which can be accomplished with a simple call via communicator.

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